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Complex Economics and Patent Remedies
-RKQ0*ROGHQ
Robert Merges and Richard Nelson’s 1990 article On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope1 focuses attention on patent rights’ capacity to slow innovative progress by “taxing”
or otherwise impeding the activities of follow-on innovators.2 They argue that such dynamic
“drag” from patent rights3 can be especially problematic with respect to “cumulative
WHFKQRORJLHVµZKLFKPLJKWEHFUXGHO\GHVFULEHGDVWHFKQRORJLHVLQZKLFKVLJQLÀFDQW
advances tend to involve a multiplicity of substantially novel features.4 Broad patent
scope can decelerate the development of such a technology by “reduc[ing] competition in
the market for improvements to the patented technology.”5 The result can be a relatively
“sluggish” rate of further technological advance.6
Current debates over the proper remedies for patent infringement have a strong relation to
0HUJHVDQG1HOVRQ·VFRQFHUQVZLWKSRWHQWLDOG\QDPLFLQHIÀFLHQFLHVRISDWHQWULJKWV2QH
not-so-subtle insight underlying modern remedies debates is that, even if follow-on activity
infringes a patent’s scope, the patent might do little to limit that activity if remedies for patent
LQIULQJHPHQWDUHVXIÀFLHQWO\OLPLWHG,IFRXUWVUDUHO\LVVXHLQMXQFWLRQVWRHQIRUFHSDWHQWVDQG
UDUHO\LVVXHGDPDJHDZDUGVWKDWDUHPRUHWKDQDVPDOOIUDFWLRQRIDQLQIULQJHU·VSURÀWVHYHQ
EURDGSDWHQWVRQIXQGDPHQWDOLQQRYDWLRQVPLJKWQRWVLJQLÀFDQWO\FKLOOIROORZRQLQQRYDWLRQ
The complementary nature of Merges and Nelson’s concern with patent scope and presentday concerns with patent remedies recalls an old lesson: the breadth of legal entitlements
*

/RRPHU)DPLO\3URIHVVRULQ/DZ8QLYHUVLW\RI7H[DV6FKRRORI/DZ,ZRXOGOLNHWRWKDQNWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV
LQDQGWKHRUJDQL]HUVRIWKH6HSWHPEHU3DWHQW6FRSH5HYLVLWHG&RQIHUHQFHDW,QGLDQD8QLYHUVLW\0DXUHU
School of Law.
1. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839
(1990).
2. See id. at 907 (describing patentees who license broadly and indiscriminately “as tollkeepers, not coordinators”).
3. See John M. Golden, Innovation Dynamics, Patents, and Dynamic-Elasticity Tests for the Promotion of Progress, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2010) (presenting “a model for innovative progress in which the rate
of progress is determined by a combination of accelerant ‘pushes’ and decelerant ‘drags’”).
4. See Merges & Nelson, supraQRWHDW ´,QPDQ\FDVHV>DFXPXODWLYH@WHFKQRORJ\GHÀQHVDFRPSOH[
system with many components, subcomponents and parts, and technical advance may proceed on a number of
different fronts at once.”).
5. Id. at 843.
6. Id. at 908.
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and the remedies for their violation can be viewed as separately tunable factors in the
achievement of social goals.7 Concern with patent scope can be associated with Guido
&DODEUHVLDQG'RXJODV0HODPHG·V´SUREOHPRI¶HQWLWOHPHQW·µWKHTXHVWLRQRI´ZKLFK
side to favor” in a legal dispute.8 Concern with patent remedies can be associated with
&DODEUHVLDQG0HODPHG·VGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHFKRLFHEHWZHHQDQREMHFWLYHO\FRPSHQVDWRU\
´OLDELOLW\UXOHµDQGDQDOWHUQDWLYH´SURSHUW\UXOHµDTXHVWLRQDERXW´WKHPDQQHULQZKLFK
entitlements are protected.”9
*LYHQWKHFRPSOHPHQWDU\QDWXUHRITXHVWLRQVDERXWSDWHQWVFRSHDQGTXHVWLRQVDERXW
patent remedies, what does Merges and Nelson’s article suggest about how to resolve
debates over the latter? First, Merges and Nelson’s discussion of distinct technology
and industry types indicates that, like doctrines regulating patent scope, doctrines
governing patent remedies will likely have distinct, context-dependent effects on different
technologies’ rates of innovative progress. Just as a “tradition of licensing” within a
given economic sector might “mitigat[e] the potential impact of broad patents,”10 such a
tradition might alleviate concerns that robust property-rule remedies will lead to socially
undesirable outcomes.11 Thus, Merges and Nelson’s argument that courts should use
“discretion” to determine patent scope in a way that is sensitive to technological and
industrial context12 seems readily extendable to debates over patent remedies.
$VZLWKSDWHQWVFRSHFRXUWVKDYHPDQ\ZD\VLQZKLFKWKH\FDQUHJXODWHSDWHQW
UHPHGLHV,QeBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,13 the Supreme Court reemphasized the
GLVFUHWLRQWKDWGLVWULFWFRXUWMXGJHVKDYHLQGHFLGLQJZKHWKHUWRJUDQWRUWRGHQ\LQMXQFWLYH
relief.14&RXUWVDOVRKDYHVXEVWDQWLDOGLVFUHWLRQLQGHWHUPLQLQJWKHVFRSHRIWKHLQMXQFWLRQV

7. See generally DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 307 (4th ed. 2010) (describing two traditions
ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHVFRSHRILQMXQFWLYHUHOLHI  ´WKHULJKWIXOSRVLWLRQDSSURDFKµDQG  ´WKHHTXLWDEOHGLVcretion approach,” with an “academic formulation” of the latter “claim[ing] that, at least in public law litigaWLRQ¶ULJKWDQGUHPHG\DUHSUHWW\WKRURXJKO\GLVFRQQHFWHG·µ TXRWLQJ$EUDP&KD\HVThe Role of the Judge
in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1293 (1976)).
*XLGR&DODEUHVL $'RXJODV0HODPHGProperty Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972).
9. Id.DW ´:KHQHYHUVRPHRQHPD\GHVWUR\WKHLQLWLDOHQWLWOHPHQWLIKHLVZLOOLQJWRSD\DQREMHFWLYHO\
determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule.”).
10. Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 883.
11. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1118 (“Wherever transactions between [two parties of concern]
DUHHDV\DQGZKHUHYHUHFRQRPLFHIÀFLHQF\LVRXUJRDOZHFRXOGHPSOR\HQWLWOHPHQWVSURWHFWHGE\SURSerty rules even though we would not be sure that the entitlement chosen was the right one. Transactions . . .
would cure the error.”).
12. Id.DW GHVFULELQJWKHSURMHFWEHLQJXQGHUWDNHQDVRQHRI´KRZWRH[HUFLVHGLVFUHWLRQµLQUHODWLRQWR
doctrines regulating patent scope).
13. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
14. Id.DW ´:HKROGRQO\WKDWWKHGHFLVLRQZKHWKHUWRJUDQWRUGHQ\LQMXQFWLYHUHOLHIUHVWVZLWKLQWKHHTuitable discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional
SULQFLSOHVRIHTXLW\µ 
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that they issue,15DQGLQGHWHUPLQLQJKRZWRHQIRUFHWKRVHLQMXQFWLRQVWKURXJKFRQWHPSW
proceedings.16$OWKRXJKGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIGDPDJHVLVW\SLFDOO\DTXHVWLRQIRUMXULHV17 a
district court can do much to regulate the evidence and experts,18 as well as the instructions
and verdict forms,19WKDWLQIRUPMXULHV·GHFLVLRQV0RUHRYHUFRXUWVFDQYDFDWHDZDUGVRI
damages that they believe to lack reasonable support in the evidence.20 Finally, courts have
VLJQLÀFDQWFRQWURORYHUVSHFLDOIRUPVRIGDPDJHV$IWHUDMXU\PDNHVDÀQGLQJRIZLOOIXO
infringement, a district court has discretion to decide by what factor—from one to three—to
multiply compensatory damages.21 Likewise, district courts have power to award attorney
fees “in exceptional cases.”22:KHQDGLVWULFWFRXUWGHQLHVDSHUPDQHQWLQMXQFWLRQWKHFRXUW
can award an “ongoing royalty.”23
,QW·O5HFWLÀHU&RUSY6DPVXQJ(OHFV&R)G )HG&LU  ´'LVWULFWFRXUWVKDYH
EURDGGLVFUHWLRQLQGHWHUPLQLQJWKHVFRSHRILQMXQFWLYHUHOLHIµ See generally Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321
86   ´7KHHVVHQFHRIHTXLW\MXULVGLFWLRQKDVEHHQWKHSRZHURIWKH&KDQFHOORUWRGRHTXLW\
and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case.”).
16. See, e.g., ,QW·O5HFWLÀHU)GDW ´>:@HUHYLHZDGLVWULFWFRXUW·VÀQGLQJRIFRQWHPSWRIDQLQMXQFtion, by infringement, for an abuse of discretion . . . .”).
17. See i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 858 (Fed. Cir.) (“Given the intensely factual nature
of a damages determination and our deferential standard of review, we are not in a position to second-guess or
VXEVWLWXWHRXUMXGJPHQWIRUWKHMXU\·Vµ cert. granted on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).
18. Id. at 852 (“We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.”); see also6(%6$Y0RQWJRPHU\
:DUG &R)G )HG&LU  ´'LVWULFWFRXUWVHQMR\ZLGHODWLWXGHWRGHWHUPLQHDGPLVVLELOLW\DQGWKHPRGHDQGRUGHURIHYLGHQWLDU\SUHVHQWDWLRQVµ LQWHUQDOTXRWDWLRQPDUNVRPLWWHG cf. Uniloc
86$,QFY0LFURVRIW&RUS1RVVOLSRSDW )HG&LU-DQ  ´(YLGHQFHUHO\ing on the 25 percent rule of thumb [for a reasonable royalty] is . . . inadmissible . . . because it fails to tie a
reasonable royalty base to the facts of the case at issue.”).
19. Compare SEB)GDW ´7KHYHUGLFWIRUPLWVHOIVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHMXU\ZDVDVNHGWREDVHLWVGDPages calculations on inducement only.”), with id. ´2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKHMXU\LQVWUXFWLRQVDOVRLQGLFDWHWKDW
WKHMXU\FRXOGDVVHVVGDPDJHVIRUGLUHFWLQIULQJHPHQWµ 
20. See5HV41HWFRP,QFY/DQVD,QF)G )HG&LU  ´%HFDXVHWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW·V
[damages] award relied on speculative and unreliable evidence divorced from proof of economic harm linked
WRWKHFODLPHGLQYHQWLRQDQGLVLQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKVRXQGGDPDJHVMXULVSUXGHQFHWKLVFRXUWYDFDWHVWKHGDPDJHV
DZDUGDQGUHPDQGVµ ,QDVSDQRIWZR\HDUVWKH86&RXUWRI$SSHDOVIRUWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWKDVYDFDWHG
PXOWLSOHMXU\DZDUGVLQSDWHQWFDVHVSee:RUGWHFK6\V,QFY,QWHJUDWHG1HWZRUNV6ROXWLRQV,QF
)G )HG&LU  ´%HFDXVHWKH>MXU\·V@YHUGLFWZDVFOHDUO\QRWVXSSRUWHGE\WKHHYLGHQFHDQG
based only on speculation or guesswork, we reverse . . . and remand for a new trial on damages.” (internal
FLWDWLRQDQGTXRWDWLRQPDUNVRPLWWHG /XFHQW7HFKV,QFY*DWHZD\,QF)G )HG&LU
  ´:HDJUHHZLWK0LFURVRIW·VDUJXPHQWWKDWVXEVWDQWLDOHYLGHQFHGRHVQRWVXSSRUWWKHMXU\·VYHUGLFW
of a lump-sum royalty payment of $357,693,056.18.”).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”); see also i4i)GDW ´$ÀQGLQJRIZLOOIXOLQIULQJHPHQWLVDSUHUHTXLVLWHWRWKHDZDUGRI
enhanced damages.”).
22. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party.”); see also,&80HG,QFY$ODULV0HG6\V,QF)G )HG&LU  ´+DYLQJ
determined that this case is exceptional, the district court appropriately exercised its discretion in awarding
attorney fees . . . .”).
23. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Under some circumstances,
DZDUGLQJDQRQJRLQJUR\DOW\IRUSDWHQWLQIULQJHPHQWLQOLHXRIDQLQMXQFWLRQPD\EHDSSURSULDWHµ 

52

IP THEORY

Volume 1: Issue 2

+RZVKRXOGFRXUWVXVHWKHLUSRZHUWRUHJXODWHSDWHQWUHPHGLHV"([WUDSRODWLRQIURP
Merges and Nelson’s analysis regarding patent scope suggests that welfare-maximizing
DQVZHUVVKRXOGEHVHQVLWLYHWRWHFKQRORJLFDQGLQGXVWULDOFLUFXPVWDQFH,QLQGXVWULHV
with a well-established and generally pervasive culture of licensing on reasonable terms,
relatively strong patent remedies might not present much of a barrier to the competitive
markets for innovation that Merges and Nelson generally favor.24 Likewise, with respect to
technologies in which individual innovations tend “not [to] point the way to wide ranging
VXEVHTXHQWWHFKQLFDODGYDQFHVµVWURQJUHPHGLHVWKDWJLYH´DSURSULHWDU\ORFNRQWKH
LQYHQWLRQµPLJKWQRW´VHULRXV>O\@KLQG>HU@LQYHQWLYHZRUNE\PDQ\RWKHUÀUPVµ25
5HJDUGLQJPRUHVSHFLÀFTXHVWLRQVRIKRZFRXUWVVKRXOGFUDIWRUFXUWDLOSDWHQWUHPHGLHV
Merges and Nelson’s ultimately moderate approach to restricting patent scope might
suggest a similarly moderate policy of curtailing remedies in a limited number of relatively
extreme situations, ones in which patent rights threaten to severely damp competitive or
LQQRYDWLYHDFWLYLW\0HUJHVDQG1HOVRQVWUHVVWKDWWKHLUSURSRVHG´GRFWULQDOPRGLÀFDWLRQV
. . . will apply only to the broader claims of a small number of patents, primarily those
on pioneering breakthroughs.”26 They contend that, “[w]ithout extensively reducing
the pioneer’s incentives, the law should attempt at the margin to favor a competitive
environment for improvements.”27 Merges and Nelson thus appear to have faith that, by
acting to forestall or to eliminate a relatively discrete set of competitive bottlenecks, patentlaw decision-makers can do much good while doing comparatively little harm. They
hesitate to suggest much more broad-based interventions.
The modesty of Merges and Nelson’s policy proposals contrasts with the dramatic
nature of some recent calls for sweeping overhaul of patent remedies, calls that at least
sometimes seem to chase a goal of remedies measured with Swiss-watch-like precision.28
Such reforms would likely be benign if they matched up well with the competences of
MXGJHVDQGMXULHV,QWKHDEVHQFHRIFRQFHUQIRUFRVWRUSRVVLEOHMXGJHRUMXU\HUURU
DGRSWLRQRIOHJDOUXOHVWKDWGHPDQGH[DFWSUHFLVLRQLQWKHDZDUGRIHTXLWDEOHRUPRQHWDU\
UHPHGLHVPLJKWVHHPPHUHO\MXVW,QWKHDEVWUDFWWKHUHPLJKWEHOLWWOHDSSDUHQWUHDVRQWR
RSSRVHOHJDOUHTXLUHPHQWVWKDW  DFRXUWLVVXHDQLQMXQFWLRQLIDQGRQO\LIWKHPRYDQW

24. See Merges & Nelson, supraQRWHDW ´2IFRXUVHWKHUHDUHSDWHQWVXLWVDQGVKRUWWHUPKROGXSVLQ
WKHÀHOGRIEXONFKHPLFDOSURFHVVWHFKQRORJ\EXWWKHVHSUREOHPVDUHXVXDOO\VHWWOHGDQGOLFHQVLQJLVDJHQHUDO
practice.”); see also id. at 883 (describing a “tradition of licensing” as “mitigat[ing] the potential impact of
broad patents”). See generally id. at 908 (stating a “basic conclusion” that, particularly with respect to “cumulative technologies,” “multiple and competitive sources of invention are socially preferable”).
25. Id. at 880-81.
26. Id. at 916.
27. Id. at 843.
28. Various recent congressional bills have, for example, proposed blanket adoption of a single standard approach for calculating reasonable-royalty damages that might be viewed as grasping at such an ideal. See
John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 582-86 (2010) (discussing legislative
proposals relating to damage awards for patent infringement).
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KDVSURYLGHGGHFLVLYHSURRIWKDWWKHLQMXQFWLRQLVRQQHWVRFLDOO\GHVLUDEOHDQG  FRXUW
DZDUGHGFRPSHQVDWRU\GDPDJHVUHÁHFWDQH[DFWDVVHVVPHQWRIKRZPXFKDGGLWLRQDOYDOXH
was added to a product or process by its infringing aspects.
But in one legal area after another, the law has recognized that courts cannot be expected
WRDFWVRSUHFLVHO\,QGHHGLWKDVORQJEHHQDSSUHFLDWHGWKDWSUHWHQVLRQVDWSUHFLVLRQFDQ
generate not only wasteful cost but even systematically inferior outcomes.29 Hence, courts
IUHTXHQWO\KDYHJUDYLWDWHGWRZDUGZD\VRIUHVROYLQJOHJDOGLVSXWHVWKDWDYRLGGHPDQGV
for absolute precision. For example, in reviewing an administrative agency’s legal
understandings,30 Congress’s economic policy choices,31 or the validity of a contract of
doubtful fairness,32 courts commonly focus not on whether the relevant legal understanding,
policy choice, or contractual arrangement is optimal, but instead on whether it is in some
VHQVHJURVVO\ZURQJ7KHLQWXLWLRQVHHPVWREHWKDWFRXUWVFDQGRVLJQLÀFDQWJRRGE\
picking out extreme cases of error or dysfunction even when they are incompetent to
JLYHSUHFLVHDQVZHUVRQTXHVWLRQVRIRSWLPDOLW\RUYDOXH0HUJHVDQG1HOVRQ·VPHDVXUHG
policy prescriptions comport with a corresponding intuition that courts might best focus on
DYRLGLQJJURVVO\GLVSURSRUWLRQDWHUHPHGLHVUDWKHUWKDQHQJDJLQJLQWKHTXL[RWLFSXUVXLWRI
absolutely precise ones.33
6ZHHSLQJUHIRUPLVVRPHWLPHVEHQHÀFLDORUHYHQQHFHVVDU\%XWDWWLPHVDFDUHIXO
incremental shift can resolve foreseeable problems with much less risk of great, unintended
29. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 FPWD ´$SDUW\ZKRKDVE\KLVEUHDFKIRUFHGWKHLQMXUHG
SDUW\WRVHHNFRPSHQVDWLRQLQGDPDJHVVKRXOGQRWEHDOORZHGWRSURÀWIURPKLVEUHDFKZKHUHLWLVHVWDEOLVKHGWKDWDVLJQLÀFDQWORVVKDVRFFXUUHG'DPDJHVQHHGQRWEHFDOFXODEOHZLWKPDWKHPDWLFDODFFXUDF\
and are often at best approximate.”); 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.3(8), at 317 (2d ed. 1993)
´$FFXUDF\LQPHDVXUHPHQWLVDGHVLUDEOHJRDOEXWLWVKRXOGQRWOHDGXVWRIRUJHWWKHGHÀQLWLRQDODQGSROLF\
elements involved, nor the limits of the enterprise.”).
&KHYURQ86$,QFY1DWXUDO5HV'HI&RXQFLO86   KROGLQJWKDWZKHUH&RQgress has implicitly delegated interpretive power to an agency, “a court may not substitute its own construction
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of [the] agency”).
)&&Y%HDFK&RPPF·QV,QF86   ´,QDUHDVRIVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFSROLF\D
VWDWXWRU\FODVVLÀFDWLRQWKDWQHLWKHUSURFHHGVDORQJVXVSHFWOLQHVQRULQIULQJHVIXQGDPHQWDOFRQVWLWXWLRQDOULJKWV
PXVWEHXSKHOGDJDLQVWHTXDOSURWHFWLRQFKDOOHQJHLIWKHUHLVDQ\UHDVRQDEO\FRQFHLYDEOHVWDWHRIIDFWVWKDW
FRXOGSURYLGHDUDWLRQDOEDVLVIRUWKHFODVVLÀFDWLRQµ 
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTSFPWF
FPWF ´,QDGHTXDF\RIFRQVLGHUDWLRQGRHVQRWRILWVHOILQYDOL´,QDGHTXDF\RIFRQVLGHUDWLRQGRHVQRWRILWVHOILQYDOL
date a bargain, but gross disparity in the values exchanged may be an important factor in a determination that
DFRQWUDFWLVXQFRQVFLRQDEOHDQGPD\EHVXIÀFLHQWJURXQGZLWKRXWPRUHIRUGHQ\LQJVSHFLÀFSHUIRUPDQFHµ 
see also id. at § 208 cmt. b (“Traditionally, a bargain was said to be unconscionable in an action at law if it
was ‘such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and
fair man would accept on the other.’”).
33. See John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2149 n.138 (2007) (sugJHVWLQJWKDWFRXUWVPLJKWGHQ\LQMXQFWLRQV´LQFLUFXPVWDQFHVZKHUHWKHFRVWVRIKDOWLQJLQIULQJHPHQWJUHDWO\
exceed both (a) reasonable estimates of the positive value of the infringement and (b) any harm to the right
holder other than its failure to recover from the infringer the positive value of infringement or the negative
value associated with the cost of terminating infringement”).
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harm. Further, a small change today can prepare the way for a more substantial
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQWRPRUURZ$VWKHZHOOIXQGHGFODPRUIRULPPHGLDWHGUDPDWLFUHIRUPRI
patent remedies continues,34 the moderation of Merges and Nelson’s policy prescriptions
might be worth keeping in mind.

34. See Golden, supraQRWHDW QRWLQJLQGXVWU\OREE\LQJHIIRUWVUHODWLQJWRTXHVWLRQVRIGDPDJHVIRU
patent infringement).
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